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This largely expository paper explores analogues of ω-completeness and ω-inconsistency, 
starting with “finite cases”.  For each positive integer n, let Ln be a first-order language 
having exactly n [individual] constants, say the digits ‘0’, ‘1’, etc. of a base-n arithmetic 
notation.  An instance of a universal sentence is the result of deleting the quantifier and 
replacing every occurrence of the freed-up variable by one and the same constant.  The 
complete induction sentence [for Ln] is the sentence expressing “for every object x, x is 0 
or x is 1 or etc.”, for L3, in symbols, Ax(x = 0 V x = 1 V x = 2).  A set of sentences is n-
complete iff it [deductively] yields every universal sentence each of whose instances it 
yields.  Theorem COM: In order for a set to be n-complete it is necessary and sufficient 
for it to yield complete induction. A set of sentences is n-inconsistent iff it [deductively] 
yields the negation of some universal sentence each of whose instances it yields. 
Theorem INC: in order for a set to be n-inconsistent it is necessary and sufficient for it to 
yield the negation of complete induction.  In that both of these theorems reduce a 
condition concerning infinitely many deductions to the deducibility of a single sentence, 
they are syntactic, or proof-theoretic, results analogous to semantic, or model-theoretic, 
results about ω-completeness and ω-inconsistency in second-order languages announced 
in my abstract “Semantic omega properties and mathematical induction”, Bulletin of 
Symbolic Logic 3 (1997) 280.  When we leave either the “finite” case or the second-order 
case to consider intermediate cases such as sublanguages (involving constants for zero 
and successor) of the usual first-order languages of number theory, we find that they do 
not admit of ω-completeness or ω-inconsistency being reducible to the deducibility of a 
single sentence.  
 
